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Abstract  
In the past decade banks invested heavily in internet technology so as to engage in e-business and e-
commerce activities. However, this development exposed banks to threats, such as online fraud. 
Consequently, there was a need to adopt security measures and controls to mitigate such threats. 
Banks in developed countries have developed a level of ‘best practice’ to reduce such online threats. 
The objective of this study was to explore the extent to which banks in the developing world were 
benefitting from the experiences of banks in the developed world in terms of how they address online 
security threats. Case studies of two Nigerian Banks were undertaken using interviews and short 
questionnaire. The findings show respondents perceived the level of threats to e-banking in Nigeria to 
be low. When adopting e-banking security controls, the case study banks placed more emphasis on the 
technical dimension than the human dimension. Senior management commitment is a significant 
barrier to adopting best practice, which is highlighted in limited financial resources being provided for 
new investment in training or customer education. The study concludes that senior managers need to 
change their perceptions and priorities towards IT security to reduce the vulnerability of their e-
banking services.  
 
Keywords: E-banking, Security, Nigeria, Case Study. 
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1 Introduction  
The worldwide banking industry has seen high levels of investment in the adoption 
and use of technology in the last decade (Zhu et al., 2004). This new technology has 
enabled banks to improve their existing processes in terms of efficiency and reliability 
while also opening up new opportunities such as e-business and e-commerce 
activities. Many banks are now conducting many of their traditional business 
activities via the internet. As a result, these banks are now more exposed to online 
security threats (Workman et al., 2008). Therefore, it is important that banks adopt 
adequate security measures and controls to mitigate such threats (Hawser, 2007). 
 
The banking industry in developed economies such as USA, UK and Hong Kong have 
implemented IT security strategies to respond to the online threats that arose from 
introducing internet banking services (Yiu et al., 2007). These security strategies are 
important not only for their primary goal of defending the banks IT systems, but also 
in ensuring high levels of customer trust and confidence in the use of e-banking. 
Therefore, security control measures can have a positive impact on a banks value 
chain activities, such as coordination to improve customer relationships (Lederer et 
al., 2001) and operational efficiencies to improve staff productivity (Chircu and 
Kauffman, 2000). Consequently, the banking industry in developed economies has 
experience and some success in mitigating online security threats.  
 
Since the 1990s, the commercial banking industry has continued to grow with 
increasing speed in the major developing countries. This rise largely reflected the 
dramatic fall in inflation and financial liberalization (Hanson, 2003). In Nigeria, the 
banking industry is seeing high levels of growth, with new regulatory controls 
introduced in 2004 making banks stronger and enabling them to establish partnership 
working with foreign banks to manage the country’s foreign reserves. Since 2004, 
Nigerian banks have invested heavily in their technology infrastructures with a desire 
to establish e-banking to provide value-added products and services such as internet 
banking and deployment of ATMs (Chiemeke et al. 2006). There was also a market-
pull for e-banking in Nigeria from consumers due to the increased popularity and use 
of the internet. Access to the internet in Nigeria has grown significantly from 200,000 
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users in 2000 to 11 million users in 2009; making it the country with the second 
largest online users in Africa (Internet World Stats, 2009). However, the global nature 
of online security threats mean that banks that are relatively inexperienced in e-
banking, such as those operating in developing economies, present new and possibly 
easier targets for online criminals, as banks operating in developed economies become 
more secure. Indeed, there are already examples of online fraud in Nigeria, with First 
Atlantic Bank Limited reporting a loss of five million naira (equivalent £20,000) from 
a single case (Chiemeke et al. 2006). Consequently, the overall aim of this research 
was to explore the extent to which banks in the developing world were benefitting 
from the experiences of banks in the developed world in terms of how they address 
online security threats.  
 
The structure and layout of this paper is: firstly, a brief review of relevant information 
system literature and a statement of the research questions for the project; secondly, a 
discussion of the research methods adopted; thirdly, the research findings are 
presented; fourthly, the results are discussed; and finally, their importance is assessed 
in the concluding section.  
2 Contextual Background and Research Objectives 
There has been considerable research undertaken concerning the security of IT 
systems for organisations in general. This research stream has identified a range of 
threats including natural disasters, theft of hardware/software, unauthorised access 
and human error (Loch et al., 1992). More recent threats identified include viruses, 
trojans, spyware, phishing, “cookie monster” and “man-in-the middle attacks” (Post 
and Kagan, 2000, Bose and Leung 2008, Goodin 2008) as well as hacking, identity 
theft, and cyber terrorism (Furnell and Warren, 1999). Other studies have tended to 
concentrate on the effectiveness of the methods used to secure information systems. 
The strategies advocated by these studies to mitigate online threats have tended to 
focus on the technical aspects of information system security. However, it is 
becoming apparent that an increasing number of studies are giving greater attention to 
the human dimensions of information systems security as well as considering 
technical dimensions. 
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In terms of the technical perspective, IT security methods have tended to involve the 
deployment of hardware, software, network infrastructures and biometric 
authentication systems. For example, banks in developed economies have increased 
their online security by deploying two-factor authentication in the form of hardware 
security tokens, one time password and digital certificates, and zero knowledge proof 
to prevent identity thefts (Bose and Leung 2008). Other methods include firewall 
technologies, virus protection, 2 way factor authentication process for customers, and 
on screen and mouse operated keypads to secure information by preventing malicious 
programs that log user keystrokes (Hutchinson and Warren 2003).  More recently, 
banks in the UK including Lloyds TSB, Barclays and Royal Bank of Scotland have 
come up with innovative ways to increase the security of their online banking service 
by providing card readers to their customers for conducting internet banking (BBC 
2008).  
 
From the human perspective, Ward and Smith (2002) suggest that IS users are an 
important resource in dealing with information security and the success of combating 
online threats depends on the level of commitment from the users. Similarly, Diniz et 
al. (2005) describe employees as the weakest link in the security chain, and mainly 
responsible for most security system failures. Hagen et al., (2008) argue that greater 
attention needs to be given to awareness activities, developing a security culture, and 
the provision of education and training as well as more common activities such as 
deploying security policies, procedures and controls, if organisations are to have 
secure information systems. However, addressing the human dimension through 
methods such as ongoing awareness training, as well as introducing technical controls, 
can be a resource intensive exercise which may be one reason that some organisations 
are choosing to concentrate on technical security methods (Thomson and Von Solms, 
2006). This may well be even more pronounced for organisations working in 
developing world economies where resource constraints are likely to be acute. For 
example, Abu-Musa (2004), found in his survey of IT security controls in Egyptian 
banks that IT Directors focused more on the technical aspects of IT security than on 
the behavioural and organisational aspects. Similarly, a survey by Hood and Yang 
(1998) on 14 banks in Shezen, China, engaging in online banking transactions, 
suggests that management were aware of security threats but did not take necessary 
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actions to mitigate or reduce the risks. This lack of action was explained as being due 
to a lack of financial resources and skilled IT personnel.  
 
Therefore, it can be argued that in terms of the research on IT security, there is an 
emerging form of ‘best practice’ that is being advocated by the literature.  In addition, 
in the developed world economies, many banks have gained significant experience in 
mitigating e-banking threats. Consequently, banks operating in developing world 
economies may be well placed to adopt the latest versions and techniques regarding 
IT security controls, without having to undertake the same learning and development 
path that the early adopters in the developed world had to take - a term referred as 
“leapfrogging” (Davison et al, 2000). However, to date the adoption of IT security 
controls and procedures by banks in the developing world has been under researched. 
 
Although banking operations started in Nigeria in 1892 with the African Banking 
Corporation (now called First Bank of Nigeria), conventional banking commenced in 
1952 (Chiemeke et al 2006). In 2004 the banking industry experienced further 
regulatory change from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) when it announced banks 
had to increase their capital base from 2 billion Naira (£8 million) to 25 billion Naira 
(£100 million). This change resulted in the number banks falling from 81 to 24. The 
re-capitalisation exercise has made Nigerian banks stronger, and enabled 14 Nigerian 
banks to partner foreign banks in managing the country’s foreign reserves (My Africa 
2006). Examples, of these partnerships include, Access Bank and Commerzbank of 
Germany, First Bank of Nigeria and H.S.B.C (UK); IBTC Chartered Bank and Credit 
Suisse (Switzerland); and Zenith Bank and J.P. Morgan (USA). Indeed, some 
Nigerian banks like Zenith, GT, Stanbic IBTC and Access now have commercial 
offices in the UK, while United Bank Africa has an office in the USA, and illustrates 
the recent boom of the Nigerian banking industry. 
 
After the banking reforms in 2004, Nigerian banks began to invest heavily in 
improving their information technology infrastructure with the intention of providing 
a wide range of value-added products and services such as ATMs and e-banking. It 
appears that Nigerian banks are keen to try to catch up with global developments in 
banking and in so doing, improve the quality of services for their customers by 
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changing from manual to automated business systems (Chiemeke et al. 2006). Ayo 
and Babajide (2006) in their survey on Nigerian banks report that all twenty four 
Nigerian banks are now engaged in e-banking. However, it appears that the Nigerian 
banks are also encountering increasing levels of cybercrime. Olugbile (2008), reports 
that banks in Nigeria have lost over N1 billion (about £4,000,000) to online financial 
fraud, identity theft, system penetration by outsiders, data and network sabotage and 
denial of service attacks. Therefore, the Nigerian banking sector provides an ideal 
context in which to investigate e-banking security in the developing world.  The 
objective of this research is to investigate the level of adoption of IT security controls 
for e-banking in Nigeria. Specifically, this research examines three interrelated 
research questions: 
 
1. To what extent are Nigerian banks following best practice in terms of IT banking 
security? 
2. To what extent are Nigerian banks addressing the technical and human aspects of 
IT security? 
3. What are the barriers and facilitators to Nigerian banks adopting the best practice 
approaches to IT security? 
It was envisaged that by exploring these issues it would be possible to provide 
valuable insights into the applicability of best practice techniques in IT security for 
the banking industry in Nigeria, and for banks operating in the developing world in 
general.  
 
3 Research Method  
A case study approach has been identified as being helpful in developing and refining 
generalisable concepts and frames of reference (Lawler et al., 1985). Similarly, Yin 
(1994) argues that a case study approach is appropriate for exploratory research and 
suggests that it can act as a useful prelude to further research. Therefore, a case study 
approach was chosen for this study.  Galliers (1992) notes that case studies are usually 
restricted to a single event or organisation and that it is difficult to collect similar data 
from a sufficient number of similar organisations making it difficult to generalise 
from case study research. To address this problem, within the constraints of access 
and limited resources, two case studies were selected for this study. 
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The case study banks were purposively chosen because they were major banks in 
Nigeria, and had several years of experience of implementing e-banking.  Bank X has 
a branch network of 63 branches, annual total earnings and shareholders’ value of 
over £110 million and £340 million respectively; while Bank Y has a branch network 
of 170 branches, with annual total earnings and shareholders’ value amounting to 
excess of £250 million and £750 million respectively.  
 
In order to study the phenomenon in depth, enabling a rich description and revealing 
its deep structure (Cavaye, 1996) a mixed method approach was adopted for data 
collection, comprising of semi-structured interviews and a survey. Data was collected 
between July 2008 and August 2008. 
 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted first with four key stakeholders in 
each bank. The participants were selected on the basis of their prior experience and 
involvement with e-banking implementation at a senior level. The semi structured 
interview schedule (see Appendix 1) comprised 16 open questions and the questions 
were sent to participants a week before the interview to aid recall and make the 
interview process more productive.  The interviews were conducted via telephone 
rather than face to face because of limited resources preventing travel to Nigeria. In 
the vast majority of cases, the initial telephone interview was complemented by a 
follow-up phone call that was used to clarify issues and attain supplementary 
information. All the phone interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed 
verbatim. Details of the range of informants interviewed at each bank is provided in 
Table 1 below. 
 
Informant Bank X Bank Y 
Head of Information 
Technology Department 
(ITD) 
  
Head of IT Security Unit   
Head of Learning and 
Development 
  
IT Systems Auditor   
Totals  4 4 
Table 1: Range of Informants Interviewed at Each Bank 
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The qualitative data analysis followed the three concurrent activities identified by 
Miles & Huberman, (1994, p. 10) of data reduction, data display and conclusion 
drawing/verification. This approach is necessary to ensure that the researcher does not 
become overloaded from unreduced data transcripts and their information processing 
abilities impaired (Faust, 1982). Data reduction was conducted on each interview 
transcript using mainly ‘in-vivo’ codes, that is, codes derived from phrases used 
repeatedly by informants (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In-vivo codes (as opposed to 
codes determined prior to the analysis) are appropriate when the research is 
essentially exploratory and are more useful in identifying new variables than adopting 
constrained literature-based codes (Diamantopoulos & Souchon, 1996). In addition, 
marginal remarks were used during the coding period to add clarity and meaning to 
the transcripts as well as having the ability to help revise and improve the coding 
structure (Chesler, 1987). From the codes it was possible to develop a series of 
within-case matrix displays for each bank which allowed the main themes that 
emerged from the interviews to be identified.  
 
To supplement the qualitative data collected, a short questionnaire was administered 
via e-mail in order to develop a better understanding of the prevalence of the themes 
identified from the interviews. The questionnaire consisted of eight closed questions 
(see appendix 2) and used either a 5 item Likert scale ranging from very high to very 
low, or a simple dichotomous scale of ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In addition, respondents were 
given the opportunity to answer ‘don’t know’ rather than forcing a response or risking 
non-response to questions. The email questionnaire was initially sent to the Head of 
the IT Department within both banks who were asked to forward the email on to all 
middle and junior managers in their departments. This process helped in achieving a 
good response rate for the questionnaire as shown in Table 2. 
 
 BANK X BANK Y 
Total Questionnaires Distributed 38 36 
Return Completed 30 22 
Non-Response 8 14 
Response Rate (%) 79 61 
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Table 2: Questionnaire Response Rates at Each Bank 
 
As has been noted earlier, the questionnaire data was intended to supplement the 
interview data and not to test hypotheses. Therefore, although the data were analysed 
using the SPSS package to generate frequency counts this analysis has been combined 
with the qualitative analysis in order to develop a richer understanding of the range 
experiences of e-banking security at each case study bank. The following section 
presents the key themes that were identified in the case study banks drawing on both 
the interview and questionnaire data as appropriate. 
 
4 Findings 
4.1 Perception of Online Security Threats 
One of the first themes to emerge from the data analysis was that the majority of 
participants from both banks were of the belief that online banking threats were 
relatively low.  This perception was shared between both senior IT managers and 
auditors and middle and junior managers that responded to the questionnaire.  This 
perception seemed to be based on the view that there had been only a limited number 
of online attacks on banks in Nigeria to date. For example,  
 
‘I do not think we have really had major problems, I heard there was one attack on 
one bank which I would not want to mention their name other than that I do not think 
it is really prevalent in Nigeria….maybe because of exposure and all that but I do not 
think it is that serious in Nigeria. I think it is still very low’ (Head of IT Security: 
Bank X). 
 
It was suggested that this perceived low level of online criminal activity was due to 
‘the criminals [having still] to perfect their skills’ (IT Systems Auditor: Bank X) and 
that the level of use and awareness of the internet was still low in Nigeria, with the 
Head of IT in Bank Y stating,  
 
‘Well right now I will say it is still low because the awareness of internet use is not 
there…to an extent people are still sceptical to online banking as well [and] 
connectivity is still a challenge… people make use of [e-banking] more to check their 
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balances just to know what they have in their account so as to make a decisions on 
either to withdraw or not.’ 
 
However, there was an acknowledgement among interviewees that the risk of online 
attack for the banks was growing.  These threats were partly generated by a lack of 
awareness from bank customers about basic security measures as they perform 
common banking operations. The Head of IT of Bank X, when commenting on the 
how he would rate the future online security threats in Nigeria stated, 
 
‘I would say that on the scale of 1-5, I will say it is 4, because even if the bank does 
all that it needs to do people are not [sufficiently] knowledgeable to protect 
themselves well. They don’t keep their PINS, they don’t watch where they 
display/disclose their card details, things like that, so it’s high’  
 
The IT System Auditor in Bank Y agreed that the threats to online security were high 
and added that this was due to existing weaknesses in the IT security infrastructure 
and the limited skills of the IT staff developing the security controls. In some cases he 
believed ‘the causes of threats are even more knowledgeable than the personnel 
providing the security.’ 
It would appear that although some key staff are aware of the growing and current 
threats to e-banking at both case study banks, the majority of respondents still 
consider the likelihood of online fraud occurring to be low. 
 
4.2 Physical and Electronic Security Controls 
Both banks have deployed both physical and electronic security to mitigate threats to 
online banking services. These controls included firewalls, proxy servers and email 
content filtering machines and well as investing heavily in anti-virus/patch 
management to secure their network infrastructure. In addition, both banks had 
adopted biometric controls to manage physical access to key locations. For example, 
the Head of IT in Bank X commented: 
 
‘We have biometrics installed on physical locations of the entrance of ITD, Server 
farm and network communication rooms that keeps a log of movement of people in 
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those locations. Also passwords of all network infrastructures are randomly changed 
and access only to staff of IT security unit’  
 
When asked about the level of data encryption and authentication processes, both 
banks were gradually introducing these measures, but still had further work to 
undertake. In terms of data encryption, the Head of IT at Bank X  stated: 
 
‘We have a policy in place which is called the information classification policy which 
grades all information that is used in the bank. This policy provides regular 
awareness to users on how to classify information to ensure that information is only 
available for use by an authorised person. Also we make sure access to data are 
protected with users credentials which is set to expire every 14 days .The eventual 
phase which we are looking at is encryption in which all the information that is on 
our users work station is encrypted so that in case of any loss or theft of such 
information cannot be accessed by any other person. That is presently going on in our 
group head office in Johannesburg. Implementation has already started from there 
and should get to Nigeria gradually. We are hoping to implement before the end of 
the year’ 
 
In terms of authentication for accessing online banking services the Head if IT for 
Bank X commented that they were only using ‘One way [authentication ] for now, 
just username and password’. Similarly, in Bank Y the Head of IT commented that 
they were adopting ‘Normal user name and password for now, but for transfer of 
funds between accounts the 2 way [authentication ] comes in with the use of a secret 
code’.  It is interesting to note that by adopting only one way authentication for its 
online banking service, Bank X does not yet meet the standards set by developing 
world banks for authentication, which means it is susceptible to easy attacks by online 
criminals. Also, although Bank Y is adopting limited 2 way authentication the secret 
code provided by Bank Y is not dynamically assigned for each transaction, resulting 
in online transactions not being as secure as they could be.  
 
In addition, both banks appeared to be taking steps to test the technical security 
controls they had implemented for their e-banking services.  Bank X appeared to be 
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more proactive in conducting these tests due to an affiliation with a foreign bank in 
South Africa. While there were still further developments to be implemented in terms 
of technical security controls, it appears that the majority of interviewees felt that the 
banks were adopting sufficient technical controls for e-banking services at the time of 
the research. This view was reinforced from the data that was collected from the 
questionnaire survey.  
 
4.3 Policies and Strategies 
Both banks had IT strategies in place although there were mixed views on how 
effective they were. For example, the IT System Auditor in Bank X commented that, 
‘I think the policies/strategies are okay as [they] address user access rights, 
privileges and controls’. Whereas, the IT System Auditor in Bank Y had the view that 
‘The policies need some fine tuning. A more detailed risk analysis and risk profiling 
should be carried out. This would bring about better policies and strategies for 
ensuring secure online banking’.  
 
Despite the concerns held by the IT System Auditor in Bank Y, it would appear that 
Bank Y is developing more robust security strategies as they are actively 
communicating their formalised information security strategies to their customers. In 
addition, Bank Y is bringing in expertise from external consultants in order to develop 
and enhance their customers’ online banking security. The Head of IT in Bank Y 
stated: 
 
‘...we actually contracted to Price Waterhouse Coopers to work on our policies and 
strategies. It is a document based on the strategic objectives of the bank for the next 
five years starting from 2007-2012. To prevent ID theft [we need] to educate our 
customers when using the internet platform. We also provide online key board instead 
of using the key stroke where customers just drop and select instead of you actually 
pressing your keyboard which can reduce the threat of passwords being stolen’  
 
4.4 IT Staff Training and Customer Awareness Initiatives 
It appears from the data gathered that both banks ensured that their IT staff were sent 
for regular training on security threats. The frequency of these training sessions varied 
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from at least once a year to more frequent training sessions supplemented with 
seminars and conferences as appropriate. The type of training also varied depending 
on the job role. Overall, the management view was that the training had been 
sufficient to offset any online security risks as demonstrated by the banks not having 
encountered any significant attacks that had been successful. For example, the Head 
of Learning and Development in Bank X stated: ‘So far we have not any had any 
major case … that has come out of security in our IT system so we believe that there 
is a pay off already…’. Bank X may also be benefitting from sending their IT staff to 
training outside Nigeria, to more developed countries such as South Africa, where 
there is greater knowledge and experience regarding responding to e-banking security 
threats. The findings also indicate that Bank X benefits from learning IT knowledge 
from its group’s head office in South Africa as highlighted by Head of Learning and 
Development commenting ‘We also liaise with our head office in South Africa for 
them to also understand the group IT security models or framework so that we can 
implement locally in Nigeria.’ 
 
Interestingly, while the banks appear to have adequate levels of training for their IT 
staff regarding current security threats, there were some concerns that this training 
may not be sufficient to protect against future threat levels. The IT System Auditor in 
Bank Y highlighted this concern commenting, 
 
‘The current skill level of the Bank’s IT Security staff may be called to question when 
the environment becomes much more competitive than it is right now. Fortunately, we 
have not yet evolved into the era of blatant hacking attempts and more sophisticated 
fraud attempts. Therefore, it is imperative that the Bank takes into consideration 
future threats so as to adequately prepare the IT Security staff for the future. In other 
words, the right skills are just not there yet’  
 
Responses to the questionnaires from both case study banks also suggested that the 
current IT staff skill levels and training were adequate but not high. There were also 
concerns that there were insufficient numbers of IT security staff employed and that 
this may limit the effectiveness of the banks IT security.   
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It is interesting to note that both banks had made limited attempts to educate their e-
banking customers about major online threats. For example, Bank X simply added a 
notice to their website warning of potential threats. Bank Y was slightly more pro-
active, by sending emails and SMS phone alerts on a regular basis when a known 
threat was present. Therefore, it would appear that improving the general awareness 
of their customers of online security issues was still an area that required further 
development. However, the findings from the questionnaire analysis suggest that 
many managers in both banks considered their banks attempts to educate customers 
were sufficient, which may explain why neither bank is making significant progress in 
this area. 
 
4.5 Barriers to Adopting Best Practice 
From the comments of interviewees in Bank Y, it appears that senior management 
commitment is a significant barrier to adopting best practice in terms of IT security 
controls. This lack of commitment was manifested through, limited financial 
resources being provided for new investment in training or technology. This is 
surprising as of the two banks, Bank Y would appear to have been the more 
successful and pro-active at addressing e-banking security threats. For example, the 
Head of IT Security in Bank Y commented, ‘Security issues are not too common, so 
people tend to take those things for granted; it takes a lot of justification for you to get 
management buying into security deployment’. The IT System Auditor in the same 
bank added, ‘In most environments, senior management does not often see the need to 
spend so much money on IT infrastructure for which they cannot see the immediate 
returns or reasons for such huge expenditure’. 
 
As well as limiting the level of financial resources for IT security a related issue was 
the lack of a dedicated budget for IT security.  In Bank X, funding for e-banking 
security had to be included in the general IT budget for the Bank. Not ring-fencing the 
IT security budget meant that it had to compete directly against other priorities, which 
may help to explain the lower level of adoption of best practice security practices at 
Bank X.  
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Responses to the questionnaire in both case study banks also suggested that the 
staffing levels within the IT department were considered inadequate by many junior 
and middle managers.  Consequently, the banks were dependent on external 
specialists for some of their IT security which was both costly and limited the levels 
of IT security controls that could be deployed, due to the need for external expertise 
for implementation and maintenance.  
 
Interviewees in Bank X identified a different barrier to effectively deploying IT 
security controls, the low levels of computer literacy of their e-banking customers. 
Consequently, there was a concern articulated in Bank X that there needed to be a 
sensible balance struck between online security controls and how onerous these 
controls made the online banking experience for customers. The Head of IT in Bank 
X commented,  
 
‘I think the major thing is customers’ ease of use because we don’t want to make 
things very hard. Most customers are not very computer literate. They just want to be 
able to check their accounts easily. So one of the things we try to do is not to make the 
process very tedious and very stressful for the customers. So we try, as much as 
possible, to make it friendly. We also try not to compromise security too much, [but] 
you have to strike a balance with the two’.  
 
This low level of computer literacy among e-banking customers may also be further 
compounded by the low levels of awareness regarding online security. Consequently, 
many e-banking customers may well resist complicated security processes if they 
perceive them to be unnecessary.  
 
5 Discussion 
The findings have identified a number of interesting results. It would appear that the 
majority of participants in both banks perceive there to be a low threat level currently 
in the Nigerian online banking industry, although some respondents did acknowledge 
that their systems were vulnerable and that the level of threat was likely to increase in 
the future.  This is despite existing evidence of internet related fraud already costing 
the Nigerian banking industry 4 million pounds Okemi (2008). This should be an area 
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of concern as it suggests a level of complacency toward e-banking security among 
Nigerian banks as they continue to expand their interests to other countries in Africa 
and further afield. This expansion and growth will make these financial institutions 
more visible across the world and it is likely that it will only be a matter of time 
before these vulnerabilities are exploited by cyber-criminals.  
 
The findings from participants indicates that they are following the technical 
dimension of best practice in e-banking security to some degree, by deploying 
technologies such as PIX firewalls, Proxy servers, Cisco gateways, and the 
installation of antivirus and patch management to secure their network infrastructure. 
These measures taken by Nigerian banks to secure their network infrastructure match 
those taken by their foreign counterparts in the UK and the US (Hutchison and 
Warren 2003). The 2 way authentication process has been partially adopted by Bank 
Y. Bank X has not yet adopting the two way authentication process but there is 
evidence of learning regarding the adoption of technical security controls from banks 
in  more developed countries, such as South Africa, where the extra security is a 
concern for use and convenience (Weir et al., 2008).  Consequently, the findings 
suggest that the Nigerian banks are benefitting from ‘leapfrogging’ in some areas of 
technical development. However, there is more work required by the Nigerian banks 
to improve their security features, such as encryption tools for preventing hacking of 
data, enhanced biometric applications like voice recognition, before they achieve the 
same level of technical security controls adopted by their foreign counterparts.  
 
In terms of the human dimension of best practice, it would appear that the Nigerian 
banks have been less successful. While it appears that the banks’ IT security staff are 
adequately prepared to combat the current level of e-banking threats there was a clear 
acknowledgement that they could easily be vulnerable to more sophisticated threats 
due to a lack of regular and updated training. Similarly, there was relatively little 
effort made by the banks to improve customer awareness of online security threats.  
This indicates that management may be placing more emphasis on investing in 
technology rather than on future staff training needs or educating their customers. It 
has been noted that poorly trained staff can be the weakest link in the security chain 
(Diniz et al., 2005). It has also been argued that organisations have to ensure they 
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have specific roles for their IT security staff, such as Incidence Response Managers 
and IT Security Managers to manage and handle online security threats (Herrera 
2006). This study’s findings suggest that the two Nigerian banks investigated do have 
one of these roles (IT Security Manager) but that the other roles are have not been 
established. The lack of pre-emptive training for potential future online attacks may 
mean that the IT security staff in these banks may not even be able to recognise 
existing and potential threats.  
 
The case study banks seemed to place more emphasis on the technical dimension of 
IT security by deploying necessary technologies to secure their online banking 
service, than on the human dimension of IT security.  It is suggested that this 
difference in emphasis is largely due to technical security implementations incurring a 
one off cost compared to human issues that require continuous investment in the form 
of staff training and customers education. The example of Bank Y not sending regular 
SMS to its customers updating them on likely threats, illustrates the reactive nature of 
the strategies adopted.  It is likely that the reactive approach by the banks is due to the 
perceived low level of online banking fraud within the Nigerian banking industry. 
Therefore it would appear that there has been less learning from the experiences of 
developed world banks, in terms of the human dimension of e-banking security 
despite links to foreign banks and consultants. 
 
A range of barriers were identified by participants to the adoption of best practice in 
e-banking security. These barriers included a lack of senior management support, the 
high cost of deploying the required technologies, and balancing security with ease of 
use of systems by users and network infrastructure. These barriers are in line with 
studies conducted in other developing countries on the banking industry (Hood and 
Young, 1998). Other areas of concern included inadequate numbers of staff in the IT 
security unit and IT staff not having the skills to mitigate more sophisticated online 
threats when deploying online banking services. The majority of these barriers appear 
to relate more to the human dimension of e-banking security which again reinforces 
the view that the case study banks are more disposed to the technical aspects of IT 
security rather than the human aspects which neglects an important aspect of best 
practice in mitigating online threats adopted in the developed world. 
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6 Conclusions 
This research has provided some important insights on the approach made by 
Nigerian banks in securing their e-banking services. Nigerian banks may not be fully 
adopting best practice by placing more emphasis on the technical dimension of e-
banking security rather than having a balance between the technical and human 
aspects of e-banking security, as adopted by much of the developed world banking 
industry. However, the technical measures taken by the Nigerian banks does suggest 
that they are learning from their counterparts in developed countries, allowing them to 
move more quickly (leapfrogging) in their implementation of more complex IT 
security controls. However, the perception of low threat levels and crucially low 
levels of senior management commitment for more pro-active and pre-emptive 
security measures (such as greater training and customer education regarding new 
online threats), suggests that the Nigerian banking industry has further lessons to learn 
from the experiences of their developed world counterparts.   
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APPENDIX 1: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
1.0 Online Security Threats  
1.1 How will you rate the security threats in online banking in Nigeria? 
 
2.0 Awareness, Training and Education 
2.1 Do IT staff undergo training on IT security?  
2.2 How often do IT staff go on the training?  
2.3 Does management feel the IT training on security is yielding the desired 
dividends?  
2.4 Do you think IT security staff have the right skills to handle  
threats and breaches that arise from the bank deploying online banking? 
2.5 Is the bank aware of phishing threats? 
2.6 What is bank doing to educate customers on the threats of phishing? 
 
3.0 Network Communication Infrastructure/Design 
3.1 What kind of network infrastructure equipment is deployed to secure the network? 
3.2 How does the bank physically secure the network? 
3.3 Is the bank investing in anti-virus or patch management to secure the IT 
infrastructure? 
3.4 What type of Authentication Process is deployed by the bank for its online 
banking customers? 
3.5 Do you test the infrastructure deployed to secure your online banking service? 
 
4.0 Policies and Strategies 
4.1 Does the ITD have an incident response plan? When it was last updated and how 
often is it updated? 
4.2 Does your department have a formalised information and security strategy? If it 
has, what are the actions adopted to prevent identity theft and online fraud on the 
network infrastructure? 
4.3 What do you think of the policies and strategies that ITD has adopted to secure 
online banking? 
4.4 How is IT security funded? 
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APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE OF ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
IT SECURITY IN NIGERIA’S ONLINE BANKING INDUSTRY: A CASE STUDY 
OF TWO BANKS 
 
Please kindly letter bold your options in response to questions below. 
 
KEY 
 
VH – VERY HIGH 
H - HIGH 
M – MEDIUM 
VL- VERY LOW 
L - LOW 
 
Y - YES 
N – No 
DK – Don’t Know 
 
1. Management Position 
Middle  Junior 
 
2. How heavily is the online banking service used by its customers? 
VH H M L VL DK 
 
3. What do you feel is the extent of security threats and breaches to the online 
banking service? 
VH H M L VL DK 
 
4. Do you think the number of IT security staff are adequate enough to ensure the 
bank’s online banking services are secured? 
Y N DK 
 
5. How well trained do you think the IT staff are to mitigate security threats and 
breaches when deploying online banking services? 
VH H M L VL DK 
 
6. Do you think IT security has deployed the right technology and processes to 
secure online banking services? 
Y N DK 
 
7. How effective are the bank’s efforts at educating customers with regard to 
potential threats? 
VH H M L VL DK 
 
8. How significant a factor is security of the bank’s network infrastructure with 
regard to it attaining market share? 
VH H M L VL DK 
 
